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COMMENT
REAL PROPERTY-MORTGAGES-Colorado's Curative Default
Statute-Foster Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors,
Inc., 521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
A Colorado statute enacted in 1965 enables mortgagors' to
prevent foreclosure by curing the default on which a mortgage
foreclosure action is based.2 Not until the recent case of Foster
Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors, Inc.,' however, did a Colo-
rado appellate court construe this curative default statute.4 Al-
though the court in Foster made a legally defensible construction
I "Mortgage" and related terms are used here generically and include "deed of trust."
For a discussion of the differences between a mortgage and a deed of trust, see G. OSBORNE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 17 (2d ed. 1970).
COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 38-39-118 (1973). The statute reads:
(1) Whenever the only default or violation in the terms of the note and
deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed is nonpayment of any sum due
thereunder, the owners of the property being foreclosed or parties liable
thereon shall be entitled to cure said particular default if, at least five days
prior to the date fixed for the foreclosure sale, such owners or parties give
written notice to the public trustee, sheriff, or other officer conducting the
sale of their intention to cure said default and violation and if, on or before
twelve o'clock noon of the date before the day upon which said sale is set,
the owners or parties pay to the officer conducting the sale all delinquent
principal and interest payments which are due as of the date of such pay-
ment exclusive of that portion of the principal which would not have been
due in the absence of acceleration, plus all costs, expenses, late charges,
attorney's fees, and other fees incurred by the holder of such note, deed of
trust, or mortgage as of the date of payment in connection with such proceed-
ings for collection and foreclosure.
(2) Upon receipt by the officer conducting the sale of the said notice
of intention to cure the default and violation, such officer shall obtain in
writing from the holder of the note, deed of trust, or mortgage a statement
of all sums of principal, interest, costs, expenses, late charges, attorney's
fees, and such other fees as aforesaid necessary to cure said default and
violation. Upon payment of all withdrawal fees and costs plus an additional
thirty-five dollars public trustees' costs to the officer conducting said sale on
or before twelve o'clock noon as provided in this section, in the form of a
certified check or cash, all proceedings for foreclosure shall terminate. The
officer conducting the sale shall forthwith deliver said sum to the holder of
the note, deed of trust, or mortgage.
(3) Nothing in this section shall constitute a waiver of any right accru-
ing after a subsequent violation of any covenant of said note, deed of trust,
or mortgage.
Some other jurisdictions have similar curative default statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2924c (West 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 86.760 (1974).
521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
1 At the time the statute was construed it was COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 118-9-18
(Supp. 1969).
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of the poorly drafted statute, dicta in the opinion support an
interpretation of the statute which would permit a mortgagee to
circumvent the statutory purpose. This comment will examine
that apparent inconsistency.
I. THE Foster OPINION
Foster conveyed property to one of the defendants in ex-
change for a promissory note secured by a first deed of trust. Two
other defendants subsequently assumed the obligation. When two
monthly installments were not paid, Foster filed an election and
demand for foreclosure, and a sale was set. Foster then discovered
that contrary to a covenant in the deed of trust, property taxes
for the preceding year had not been paid. One defendant at-
tempted to cure the default by tendering the past due install-
ments and receipts from the payment of the property taxes. Fos-
ter would not accept the tender and the public trustee refused to
foreclose, whereupon Foster brought suit.5
Foster did not question the mortgagor's right under the cura-
tive default statute to cure a default resulting from a failure to
pay past due installments of principal and interest. Instead, Fos-
ter objected to the public trustee's position that the statute also
cured defaults resulting from a failure to pay real property taxes
when due. Additionally, it was Foster's contention that even if
foreclosure of the deed of trust were barred, the curative default
statute did not prohibit a suit on the note. The court of appeals
held that (1) the statute applies to a default resulting from a
failure to pay real property taxes, and (2) a mortgagor's compli-
ance with the statute precludes the mortgagee from pursuing an
independent claim on the note.
A. Nonpayment of Taxes
In describing the type of default which may be cured, the
Colorado statute first refers to a default consisting of
I Foster's complaint had two claims, the first of which was for the amount due on
the promissory note secured by a deed of trust. The second claim was an action under
rule 106 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to compel the public trustee to conduct
a foreclosure sale pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust. The lower court dismissed
both claims of Foster's complaint by granting defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Because the court went beyond the pleadings and considered affidavits
submitted by the parties, the motion should have been treated as one for summary judg-
ment. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The court of appeals modified the lower court's order to
provide that summary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants and, as modified,
affirmed the lower court's judgment.
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"nonpayment of any sum due"' under the note and mortgage or
deed of trust, but then specifies only "delinquent principal and
interest payments . . . plus all costs, expenses, late charges, at-
torney's fees, and other fees incurred by the holder of such note.
S. ., as those sums which must be paid to effect the cure.' In
its appellate brief, Foster advanced several arguments to show
that the statute should not apply to the nonpayment of taxes.,
The court did not address itself to any of Foster's specific argu-
ments on this point, but summarily stated that "the phrase 'any
sum due thereunder' is susceptible to an interpretation including
delinquent taxes."'' 0 The rule of construction that a remedial stat-
ute should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
* COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-39-118 (1973) (emphasis added).
Id.
The more clearly drafted California statute specifies a
default in payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or ...
failure of trustor or mortgagor to pay, in accordance with the terms of such
obligation or of such deed of trust or mortgage, taxes, assessments, premiums
for insurance or advances made by beneficiary or mortgagee in accordance
with the terms of such obligation or of such deed of trust or mortgage...
as one which may be cured. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West 1974). The Oregon statute also
expressly permits the curing of the same defaults as those listed above in the California
statute. ORE. REV. STAT. § 86.760 (1974). The Illinois statute refers more generally to "a
default under the terms of the trust deed or mortgage." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
1 For instance, Foster correctly pointed out that the statute does not specifically refer
to taxes or insurance which, it said, "would have been easy to add." Brief for Appellant
at 10, Foster Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors, Inc., 521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974). Foster also pointed to the language of the statute, which requires a "default or
violation in the terms of the note and deed of trust." Id. Because the obligation to pay
taxes was in the trust deed alone and not also in the note, as the conjunction "and" would
require, Foster argued that this type of default was not within the statutory language. Id.
Foster also cited the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, by which the inclusion of
the specified items of principal and interest would exclude the nonpayment of taxes as a
curable default. Id. at 11. While the technical problems in the statute on which the first
two arguments are based can most likely be attributed to careless drafting, rather than
to any intention on the part of the legislature to achieve subtle distinctions, the last
mentioned argument has more merit.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the "expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1968). The
expressio unius maxim, while differing slightly from the one cited by Foster, is substan-
tially the same, and comments about one would apply equally well, it seems, to the other.
The expressio unius maxim is not particularly "legal," but rather is the result of common
sense and general experience that When people say one thing they do not mean another.
2A J. SUmERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.24 (4th ed. C. Sands
1973). The maxim, however, is only an aid to construction and not a rule of law, and "can
never override clear and contrary evidences of ...[legislative] intent." Neuberger v.
Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
11 521 P.2d at 1297.
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pose" would have adequately countered Foster's arguments on
this issue. While the court did not adopt that rule in reaching its
decision, it did reach the consistent conclusion that
[tlhe statute must be interpreted so as to carry out the general
legislative intent, which was to permit debtors to prevent foreclosure
of mortgages or deeds of trust in instances in which the creditor's
interests will not be jeopardized.2
In this case Foster's interests were not in jeopardy because the
mortgagor did pay the unpaid taxes, and thus "[t]he lien for
unpaid taxes was. . . dissolved and any impairment of the credi-
tor's collateral resulting from overdue taxes vanished."' 3
B. No Action on the Note
In its second holding the court barred the initiation of an
action on the note once a mortgagor has complied with the stat-
ute. Because the effect of curing a default under the statute is to
make the mortgagee whole as if no default had ever occurred, the
court concluded that without the necessary element of a default,
the mortgagee had no basis upon which to declare an acceleration
of the note. Such a construction is essential if the statute is to
provide any substantive relief to mortgagors. As the court noted,
a contrary decision would permit a mortgagee to easily circum-
vent the effect of the statute and to achieve indirectly what it was
prevented from doing directly. 4
1 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 (4th ed. C. Sands
1974). A liberal construction is one which makes the statutory rule apply to more situa-
tions than it would under a strict construction. Id. Courts have generally given the term
"remedial" a limited meaning and have applied it to legislation that is not penal or
criminal in nature. The term is also used to describe legislation of a procedural nature
that does not affect substantive rights. Id. § 60.02. Colorado's statute meets both tests
and thus qualifies for a liberal construction. The statute is not penal or criminal in nature.
While it could be argued that the statute abrogates the mortgagee's right to foreclose, the
statute is merely a procedural postponement of the exercise of that right. A California
case, in applying its similar curative default statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c (West 1974),
said that the purpose of the statute is not extinguishment of the ultimate obligation.
Magnus v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 1, 208 P.2d 407 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949). The Colorado
statute does not affect the mortgagor's ultimate obligation to pay the debt.
"1 521 P.2d at 1297.
13 Id.
11 Permitting a mortgagee to sue on the note after the default which was the basis of
the acceleration had been cured would subject the mortgagor to liability for the entire
debt. The court said that this construction urged by the plaintiff would allow a creditor




II. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROBLEMS
A. No Right to Cure Without Foreclosure Action
A significant question regarding the scope of the statute a-
rises from dicta in the Foster case. The court pointed out that the
statute applies only to foreclosure proceedings and that
"[s]tatutory coverage is therefore triggered by initiation of fore-
closure proceedings on the mortgage or deed of trust."'" In Colo-
rado, however, a mortgagee is not obligated to foreclose. It has the
independent remedy of pursuing an action on the note." Because
the Colorado curative default statute is limited by its language
to foreclosure proceedings, an interpretation supported by dicta
in the Foster case itself, the statute might have the anomalous
effect of encouraging a mortgagee to avoid its impact by bringing
an action on the note, rather than a foreclosure proceeding. In
that event, the mortgagor would have no right to cure the default,
which would have been curable had a foreclosure action been
elected by the mortgagee, and the mortgagor would be fully liable
on any judgment resulting from the action.
B. Statutory Coverage When Foreclosure Follows Action on
Note
In order to give full effect to its remedial nature, the statute
should be interpreted to allow the curing of a default if the mort-
gagee first commences an action on the note, and even if it ob-
tains a judgment for the entire debt, and then institutes foreclo-
sure proceedings. Such an interpretation would permit the mort-
gagor to avoid foreclosure, which clearly is the statutory intent.
Although a mortgagor would still be personally liable for any
judgment on the note, the mortgagee would be prevented from
reaching the mortgaged property, except possibly in execution as
11 521 P.2d at 1298. The court also said, "It is important to note... that by its terms,
the statute applies only to deeds of trust or mortgages 'being foreclosed' and that the
statutory mechanism for tender operates through the public trustees or other officers
'conducting the sale.'" Id.
' Foothills Holding Corp. v. Tulsa Rig, Reel & Mfg. Co., 155 Colo. 232, 393 P.2d 749
(1964); Greene v. Wilson, 90 Colo. 562, 11 P.2d 225 (1932); Folda Real Estate Co. v.
Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924). Some jurisdictions have a "one action rule,"
which differs from the law in Colorado by requiring a mortgagee to exhaust the security
by a foreclosure proceeding before the general assets of the mortgagor can be reached. G.
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 334 (2d ed. 1970). See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES




a judgment creditor." A construction of the statute which would
allow the mortgagor to cure a default and prevent foreclosure
notwithstanding its personal liability on the debt would not be at
odds with the language of the statute, which merely refers to any
foreclosure proceeding. The applicability of the statute is not
restricted to foreclosure proceedings occurring before an action on
the note, and thus the statute should provide coverage when the
foreclosure proceeding follows the note action.
III. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
Because these problems of construction and application are
due primarily to poor drafting, the legislature might consider
amending the curative default statute. Amendment could accom-
plish several objectives. First, it could dispel statutory ambiguity
and inconsistency of reference concerning the types of defaults
which may be cured. The language of the statute should be ex-
pansive enough to include, as a minimum, any type of default
which may be cured by the payment of money.'"
Second, amendment could make the curative right applica-
ble when the mortgagee elects to first pursue an action on the
note. Upon a mortgagee's commencement of an action on the
note, a mortgagor should have the right to cure the default in a
manner similar to that provided by the statute for foreclosure
actions. A right to cure at this point would cut off any further
action on the note. Since the same default gives rise to both of
the mortgagee's remedies, foreclosure and an action on the note,
the mortgagor's right to cure the default should not depend upon
which remedy the mortgagee elects. This change could be
achieved only by statutory amendment, because, in this instance,
the restrictive language of the statute would preclude judicial
construction encompassing such an expanded curative right.
Third, the statute could be amended to limit the frequency
I7 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-52-102 (1973) provides that "[all goods ... and real
estate of every person against whom any judgment is obtained ... are liable to be sold
on execution to be issued upon such judgment. . . ." Id. § 13-52-105 (1973) states that
"[e]very interest in land, legal and equitable, shall be subject to levy and sale under
execution .... " Of course, if the mortgaged property qualifies for the homestead exemp-
tion, id. § 38-41-201 (1973) would limit a mortgagee's right to levy against that property.
"1 Additional defaults which could be included in the statute are a mortgagor's failure
to pay assessments, insurance premiums, or advances made by the mortgagee. The Cali-
fornia statute, CAL. CtV. CODE § 2924c (West 1974), and the Oregon statute, ORE. REV.
STAT. § 86.760 (1974), both expressly include these defaults. See note 8 supra for the
pertinent language of the California statute.
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with which a mortgagor may avail itself of the benefits of the
statute, since a mortgagor's repeated use of the right to cure
defaults may place an unfair burden on the mortgagee. The cura-
tive default statute of Illinois'9 seems to recognize the desirability
of granting mortgagors some relief without thereby unduly bur-
dening mortgagees. That statute provides that
[tihe relief granted by this Section shall not be exhausted by a
single use thereof, but shall not be again available under the same
trust deed or mortgage for a period of 5 years from the date of the
dismissal of such proceedings.w
The use of such a limitation would achieve a more equitable
balance between the needs and rights of the parties.
Fourth, the statute could set a maximum attorney's fee
which may be included in the fees that the mortgagor must pay
to effect a cure.' Such a provision would prevent a mortgagee
from using prohibitive attorney's fees to discourage a mortgagor
from exercising its statutory right to cure. The additional fees
which a mortgagor must pay to cure a default are presumably not
punitive, but are intended only to compensate the mortgagee for
its actual costs in bringing a foreclosure suit. A statutory limita-
tion on the amount of attorney's fees recoverable under the stat-
ute 2 could ensure that this provision is used for the purpose of
compensation only.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Foster case the Colorado Court of Appeals construed
the remedial curative default statute and made a legally defensi-
ble construction insofar as the issues of the case required. Unan-
swered questions about the scope and operation of the statute
could be resolved by legislative amendment. Absent such action,
however, Colorado courts may face these questions in future
cases; should this happen, it is hoped that they will construe the
statute to further its remedial purposes.
Holly L. Carlson
"ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
"Id.
21 Mortgage loans falling within the scope of the UNIFORM CONSumER ClRDrr CODE
(U.C.C.C.) would be subject to COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-3-514 (1973), which limits
attorney's fees to a reasonable sum not in excess of 15 percent of the unpaid debt. Relief
under the U.C.C.C. is not intended to extend to the first mortgage market, however, and
the U.C.C.C. does not apply to the typical case in which the curative default statute is
invoked. See id. § 5-3-105 (1973).
" See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c (West 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 86.760 (1974).

